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Abstract
In this paper we analyse a hybrid authentication protocol due to Chien and
Jan, designed for use in large mobile networks. The proposed protocol con-
sists of two sub-protocols, namely the intra-domain authentication protocol
and the inter-domain authentication protocol, which are used depending on
whether the user and the request service are located in the same domain.
We show that both sub-protocols suffer from a number of security vulnera-
bilities.
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1 Introduction
With recent rapid development in computer network technologies, especially
in mobile network technology, it has become easier and easier for people
to access network services provided by a variety of service providers all
over the world. Accordingly, a lot of research has been devoted to the
authentication protocols which enable the users to be authenticated by the
service providers before consuming the requested services – see for example
[7]. Among these existing authentication protocols, Kerberos, which was
developed in the mid-’80s as part of MIT’s Project Athena [1], is one of
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the most widely deployed protocols. Kerberos version 5 [6] is the current
standard version. Although Kerberos is widely used, it is not only vulnerable
to password guessing attacks but also very inefficient when inter-domain
authentications are required. Many efforts have been devoted to improve
the security, the scalability, and/or the efficiency of Kerberos, including
Shieh et al. [9], Kao and Chow [5], Ganesan [4], Fox and Gribble [3], Sirbu
and Chuang [10], Samarakoon and Honary [8], and Chien and Jan [2].
In [2], Chien and Jan first demonstrate the security weaknesses in certain
session key certificate based protocols [5, 9], and then propose a hybrid
authentication protocol for large mobile networks based on public key cryp-
tography, challenge-response and hash chaining. The proposed protocol con-
sists of two sub-protocols, namely the intra-domain authentication protocol
and the inter-domain authentication protocol, which are used depending on
whether or not the user and the request service are located in the same do-
main. In the inter-domain authentication protocol, the user and the request
service are located in the domain of the same KDC. In the inter-domain
authentication protocol, it is assumed that each domain has a KDC and the
KDC acts as the authority center for its domain. These different KDCs are
organized as a DNS-based PKI tree hierarchy [11].
The authors [2] claim that their protocol simultaneously possesses several
practical merits including good scalability, low communication and compu-
tational costs, and resistance to session key compromise attacks. However,
we show that the proposed protocol suffers from a number of security prob-
lems.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review
the proposed hybrid authentication protocol. In Section 3, we give our
attacks on the proposed protocol. In Section 4, we describe the possible
improvements and conclude the paper.
2 Review of the hybrid authentication protocol
The hybrid authentication protocol proposed in [2] provides both intra-
domain and inter-domain authentication. The intra-domain authentication
protocol is designed for an environment where all the users and servers are
registered at one common key distribution centre, while the inter-domain
protocol is for an environment with more than one key distribution cen-
tre. Both protocols are composed of two phases: initial authentication and
subsequent authentication.
It is assumed that every principal, i.e. every user, server and KDC, possesses
an asymmetric key pair which can be used for encrypting and decrypting
data strings, and that every principal possesses a certificate for their pub-
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lic key signed by a generally trusted CA. Moreover, KDCs are assumed to
possess personal information about each principal in their domain and be
able to verify the certificate of each principal in their domain. To simplify
matters we implicitly assume that the same key pair is used for both encryp-
tion and signature generation, although changing this assumption would be
simple.
The following notation is used in the description of the hybrid authentication
protocol.
• U,UID: U is a user, and his identity is denoted by UID.
• S, SID: S is a server, and his identity is denoted by SID.
• (M)K : The result of symmetrically encrypting M using the secret key
K.
• (M)PubX : The result of asymmetrically encryptingM usingX’s public
key PubX .
• CertX : The public key certificate of principal X.
2.1 The intra-domain authentication protocol
We suppose that the Key Distribution Centre for the domain is KDC, and
that S is a server registered with this KDC. If a user U wants to authenticate
himself to S, he initiates the following sub-protocols.
2.1.1 Initial authentication
1. U → S: UID, {NU}PubKDC , CertUID
U selects a random number NU and encrypts it with the public key
PubKDC of KDC. Then U sends his identity UID, the encrypted nonce
{NU}PubKDC and his public key certificate CertUID to S.
2. S → KDC: UID, {NU}PubKDC , CertUID , SID, {NS}PubKDC , CertSID
S selects a random number NS and encrypts it with the public key
PubKDC of KDC, then forwards the received data as well as his iden-
tity SID, his public key certificate CertSID and his encrypted nonce
{NS}PubKDC to KDC.
3. KDC → S: {UID, NS ,K, fm(a),m, {NU , SID, a, fm(a), m, TicketU,S}
PubU }PubS 1
1Note that SID is already contained in TicketU,S , and thus two copies of SID are present
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KDC verifies the received certificates and, if the verification succeeds,
decrypts {NS}PubKDC and {NU}PubKDC . Then KDC chooses a ran-
dom number a and a new master key K to be used by U and S, and
prepares a ticket TicketU,S = UID||SID||K||V T ||Sig for this request,
where V T is the validity period of this ticket, and Sig is KDC’s sig-
nature on this ticket. Finally, KDC generates and sends the above
message to S, where fm represents m iterations of hash-function f , m
is the maximum number of times that this ticket can be used.
4. S → U : {NU , SID, a, fm(a), m,T icketU,S}PubU 2
S decrypts the message and checks the presence of the nonce NS and
UID. If the check succeeds, he accepts this message and stores the
values fm(a) and m for later authentications and computes K0 =
f(K ⊕ fm(a)) as the first session key. S then discards the master key
K and sends the above message to U .
U decrypts the received message and checks the nonce NU and the ticket. If
the check succeeds, he accepts this ticket and secretly stores a and K. Then
U computes and stores K0 = f(K ⊕ fm(a)) and {UID, T icketU,S}PubS for
later authentications.
2.1.2 Subsequent authentication
In the i-th subsequent authentication (1 ≤ i ≤ m), U starts the following
protocol.
1. U → S: {UID, T icketU,S}PubS , (fm−i(a))Ki−1
U sends the pre-computed data {UID, T icketU,S}PubS and (fm−i(a))Ki−1
to S.
2. S → U : (fm−i(a))Ki
S decrypts {UID, T icketU,S}PubS to obtain the ticket TicketU,S . Using
the information in the ticket, S derives the master keyK and computes
the current session key Ki−1 = f(K⊕fm−i+1(a)), where fm−i+1(a) is
the current stored hash value for U . He then uses this session key to
decrypt the second part of the message, derives fm−i(a), and checks
in {NU , SID, a, fm(a), m,T icketU,S}PubU . One copy of SID can thus be deleted, in which
case the encrypted message becomes {NU , a, fm(a), m,T icketU,S}PubU . If such a change
is made, then the message in next step should be changed accordingly.
2This specification for message 4 differs slightly from the specification in [2], where it
is stated that S sends {NU , SID, a, TicketU,S}PubU . This change has been made because
the specification in [2] would appear to be an error, since S cannot construct the message
as specified in [2].
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whether f(fm−i(a)) equals the stored hash value fm−i+1(a). If the
check succeeds, S computes the new session key Ki = f(K⊕fm−i(a))
and sends (fm−i(a))Ki to U . Finally, S replaces the stored hash value
with fm−i(a) and discards the ticket.
U generates and uses the new session key Ki to decrypt the received mes-
sage and checks whether fm−i(a) is present. If so, he believes that S has
confirmed the new session key.
2.2 The inter-domain authentication protocol
Suppose a user UX wants to access the server SY , where UX is registered
at KDCX , SY is registered at KDCY , and both KDCX and KDCY are
registered at KDC0. UX initiates the following sub-protocols.
2.2.1 Initial authentication
1. UX → SY : UXID , {NUX}PubKDCX , CertUXID
UX selects a random number NUX and encrypts it with the public key
PubKDCX of KDCX . Then UX sends his identity UXID , the encrypted
nonce {NUX}PubKDCX and his public key certificate CertUXID to SY .
2. SY → KDCY : UXID , {NUX}PubKDCX , CertUXID , SYID , {NSY }PubKDCY ,
CertSYID
SY selects a random number NSY and encrypts it with the public
key PubKDCY of KDCY , then sends the received data as well as his
identity SYID , his public key certificate CertSYID and his encrypted
nonce {NSY }PubKDCY to KDCY .
3. KDCY → KDC0: UXID , {NUX}PubKDCX , CertUXID , SYID , CertKDCY ,{NKDCY }PubKDC0
KDCY decrypts {NSY }PubKDCY and storesNSY , selects a random num-
ber NKDCY , and sends the above message to KDC0.
4. KDC0 → KDCX : {UXID , {NUX}PubKDCX , CertUXID , SYID , KDCYID ,
NKDCY , CertKDCY }PubKDCX
KDC0 decrypts {NKDCY }PubKDC0 , then generates and sends the above
message to KDCX , where KDCYID denotes an identifier for KDCY .
5. KDCX →KDCY : {NKDCY , SYID , UXID , CertUXID , infoUXID , NUX}PubKDCY
KDCX decrypts the received message and {NUX}PubKDCX , generates
the personal information infoUXID regarding UX , and sends the above
message to KDCY . The personal information infoUXID consists of the
validity period and privileges of UX .
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6. KDCY → SY : {NSY , UXID , TIDUX , K, fm(a), m, {NUX , SYID ,
CertSYID , TIDUX , f
m(a), m, a, TicketUX ,SY }PubUX }PubSY 3
KDCY decrypts and checks NKDCY and infoUXID . If the check suc-
ceeds, he assigns a temporary identity TIDUX for user UX and signs
a ticket TicketUX ,SY for UX , where the ticket has the same contents
as in the intra-domain protocol except that UID is replaced by TIDUX
and SID is replaced by SYID . Then KDCY sends the above message to
SY .
7. SY → UX : {NUX , SYID , CertSYID , TIDUX , fm(a),m, a, TicketUX ,SY }PubUX
SY decrypts the received message, checks NSY , computes K0 = f(K⊕
fm(a)), and keeps f(a)m and a for later authentication. Then SY
forwards the above message to UX .
UX decrypts the received message and checks the nonce NUX as well as the
derived ticket. If the check succeeds, he accepts this ticket and secretly
stores a and K. Then UX computes and stores K0 = f(K ⊕ fm(a)) and
{TIDUX , T icketUX ,SY }PubSY for later authentications.
2.2.2 Subsequent authentication
The subsequent authentication procedure is identical to that in the intra-
domain authentication protocol, except that UID is replaced by TIDUX .
3 Cryptanalysis results
We now show that the proposed scheme suffers from two serious security
problems.
1. The initial authentication part of the intra-domain authentication pro-
tocol has a major weakness. This allows a malicious but genuine user,
V say, who can interfere with messages sent and received by S, to
impersonate another user, say U , to server S. The attack operates as
follows.
(a) V → S: UID, {NU}PubKDC , CertUID
V (pretending to be U) sends the first message of the initial
authentication procedure to S.
3This specification for message 6 differs slightly from the specification in [2], where it is
stated that S sends {NSY , UXID , TIDUX , K, fm(a), m, {NUX , SYID , CertSYID , TIDUX ,
a, TicketUX ,SY }PubUX }PubSY . This change has been made because the specification in
[2] would appear to be an error, since otherwise S cannot construct message 7 as specified
in [2].
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(b) S →KDC: UID, {NU}PubKDC , CertUID , SID, {NS}PubKDC , CertSID
S proceeds by sending the second message of the initial authen-
tication procedure to KDC. We suppose that this message is in-
tercepted by V , and does not reach KDC.
(c) V, now acting on his/her own behalf, starts a second invocation
of the initial authentication procedure.
i. V → S: VID, {NS}PubKDC , CertVID
Note that, rather than choosing a new random nonce NV
and encrypting it using the public key of KDC, V copies the
encrypted value of NS from the message S sent to KDC (in
step b).
ii. S → KDC: VID, {NS}PubKDC , CertVID , SID, {N ′S}PubKDC ,
CertSID
S proceeds by sending the second message of the initial au-
thentication procedure to KDC.
iii. KDC → S: {VID, N ′S ,K, fm(a),m, {NS , SID, a, fm(a), m,
TicketV,S}PubV }PubS
KDC responds to S with the third message of the initial
authentication procedure.
iv. S → V : {NS , SID, a, fm(a),m, T icketV,S}PubV
S now sends the fourth message of the initial authentication
procedure to V .
When V decrypts the received message, V has a copy of NS ,
which V should not know. V can further recover a (and also
K from TicketV,S). V can use this information to fabricate the
third message of the first invocation of the initial authentication
procedure (to make it look as if it comes from KDC), as follows.
V generates K ′ and a′, computes fm(a′), and puts TicketU,S =
UID||SID||K ′||V T ||Sig, where Sig is a random bit string of the
right length. Then V impersonates KDC to send the following
message to S. Observe that S has no way of knowing that the
encrypted string within the message is encrypted under PubV
rather than PubU .
V → S: {UID, NS ,K ′, fm(a′),m, {NS , SID, a′, fm(a′),m, TicketU,S}
PubV }PubS
(d) S → V : {NU , SID, a′, fm(a′), m, TicketU,S}PubV
When S decrypts the received message, the value of NS will be
correctly included, as is UID, at which point S will falsely believe
that the first message (in step a) came from U . S will now send
the final message of the initial authentication procedure to U ,
which we suppose that V suppresses.
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The above attack shows how it is possible to defeat the initial au-
thentication procedure for the intra-domain protocol. We now show
how, in certain circumstances, the above attack can be extended to
the subsequent authentication procedure.
V first assembles the following dummy ticket, TicketU,S as: TicketU,S
= UID||SID||K ′||V T ||Sig where Sig is a dummy signature (e.g. a ran-
dom bit string of the right length). V then sends the first message of
the subsequent authentication procedure (impersonating U) as:
(a) V → S: {UID, T icketU,S}PubS , (fm−i(a′))Ki−1
Whether or not this is accepted by S as a valid message from U de-
pends on how the message is processed by S. In the protocol descrip-
tion in [2] there is no mention of the checking of the signature Sig. If
the description in [2] is followed, then this impersonation of U by V
will be successful. However, checking of Sig will reveal the fraud, and
hence it is simple to repair this part of the protocol.
Finally note that a similar approach to that described above can be
used by a malicious user V to learn the value of NU chosen by another
user. It is not clear how this might be used to attack the protocols,
but it does appear to be an undesirable feature (it also contradicts an
assertion made in Section 4.1.1 of [2]).
2. The initial authentication part of the inter-domain authentication pro-
tocol has a major weakness. This allows a malicious but genuine user,
V say, who can interfere with messages sent and received by other
entities, to grant himself any privilege to access a server, regardless
of whether or not V should legitimately possess such a privilege. The
attack operates as follows.
Suppose a user V is registered at KDCX with identity VID, the SY is
registered at KDCY , and that both KDCX and KDCY are registered
with KDC0. Suppose further that V is also registered at KDC0 with
identity V ∗ID, and that server S0 is registered with KDC0. Note that
we are assuming that KDC0 is used both to certify lower level CAs
(KDCX and KDCY ), and to certify users and register servers — this
is certainly not ruled out by Chien and Jan [2].
To conduct the attack, V first initiates the initial authentication of
the inter-domain protocol with SY as follows.
(a) V → SY : VID, {NV }PubKDCX , CertVID
V sends the first message of the initial authentication procedure
to SY .
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(b) SY → KDCY : VID, {NV }PubKDCX , CertVID , SYID , {NSY }PubKDCY ,
CertSYID
SY proceeds by sending the second message of the initial authen-
tication procedure to KDCY .
(c) KDCY → KDC0: VID, {NV }PubKDCX , CertVID , SYID , CertKDCY ,{NKDCY }PubKDC0
KDCY proceeds by sending the third message of the initial au-
thentication procedure to KDC0. We suppose that this message
is intercepted by V , and does not reach KDC0.
(d) V then starts an invocation of the intra-domain initial authen-
tication procedure with server S0, using his second identity V ∗ID.
Note that use of this procedure is appropriate since both V and
S0 are registered with KDC0.
i. V → S0: V ∗ID, {NKDCY }PubKDC0 , CertV ∗ID
Note that, rather than choosing a new random nonce NV
and encrypting it using the public key of KDC0, V copies
the encrypted value of NKDCY from the message KDCY sent
to KDC0 (in step c).
ii. S0→KDC0: V ∗ID, {NKDCY }PubKDC0 , CertV ∗ID , S0ID , {NS0}PubKDC0 ,
CertS0ID
S0 proceeds by sending the second message of the initial au-
thentication procedure to KDC0.
iii. KDC0→ S0: {V ∗ID, NS0 ,K ′′, fm(a′′),m, {NKDCY , S0ID , a′′, fm(a′′),
m, TicketV,S} PubV }PubS0
KDC0 responds to S0 with the third message of the initial
authentication procedure.
iv. S0 → V : {NKDCY , S0ID , a′′, fm(a′′), m, TicketV,S} PubV
S0 now sends the fourth message of the initial authentication
procedure to V .
When V decrypts the received message, V gains a copy ofNKDCY ,
which V should not know.
(e) V → KDCY : {NKDCY , SYID , VID, CertVID , InfoVID , NV }PubKDCY
Using knowledge of NKDCY , V impersonates KDCX to generate
and send the message to KDCY . It should be noted that V can
set any valid time and privilege in InfoVID .
(f) KDCY → SY : {NSY , VID, TIDV , K, fm(a), m, {NV , SYID ,
CertSYID , TIDV , a, TicketV,SY }PubV }PubSY
KDCY decrypts and checks NKDCY and infoVID . Since NKDCY
is correctly involved, the check will succeed. KDCY assigns a
temporary identity TIDV and signs a ticket TicketV,SY for V .
Then KDCY sends the above message to SY .
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(g) SY → V : {NV , SYID , CertSYID , TIDV , fm(a),m, a, TicketV,SY }PubV
SY decrypts the received message, checks NSY , computes K0 =
f(K ⊕ fm(a)), and keeps f(a)m and a for later authentication.
Then SY forwards the above message to V .
The above attack shows how it is possible to defeat the initial au-
thentication procedure for the inter-domain protocol. Since all the au-
thentication data is created correctly, even the signature in the ticket
TicketV,SY is also valid. So defeating the subsequent authentication in
the inter-domain protocol is straightforward, and V is able to fraudu-
lently obtain the service he wants.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have analysed a hybrid authentication protocol designed
for use in large mobile networks. We have shown that the proposed protocol
suffers from a number of security problems.
Instead of time-stamps, the Chien-Jan protocol uses nonces to prevent re-
play attacks; however, this, combined with protocol design shortcomings,
results in the security vulnerabilities in section 3. To eliminate these vul-
nerabilities, we could require the KDCs to sign every message they send
out. In addition, the server should validate the ticket TicketU,S the first
time it receives it. These changes prevent the attacks identified in this pa-
per; however, other attacks may still be possible. In general, it would be
unwise to use this modified protocol, or any other protocol for that matter,
without firm evidence of its robustness, e.g. as provided by a formal proof
of security.
In the proposed protocol, public key cryptographic techniques are used for
authentication, and the initial authentication phase needs to be re-executed
when the hash chain is used up. For a mobile device with very limited
resources, the associated computational requirements might be an unac-
ceptably heavy burden. Improving the efficiency of the Chien-Jan protocol,
whilst ensuring that it is secure, is a challenging task.
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